Netcat 1.10 Tutorial ://



Contents ://

  1. Basic Use
  2. Application Use
  3. Extended Use
  4. Other Information


Basic Use ://

  • Clients and Servers
  • The Readme file
  • Netcat Man page

    The most basic and straight forward use for netcat is as a TCP or UDP client or server.

    Client Socket connections
    Create a TCP Client ( active socket )
    # nc 192.168.1.10 -p 23
    this will create a telnet connection to TCP port 23 on 192.168.1.10

    Create a UDP Client
    # nc -u 192.168.1.10 -p 23
    this will create a UDP socket to UDP port 23 on 192.168.1.10


    Server Socket connections
    Create a TCP Server ( passive )
    # nc -v -l -p 23
    this will create a TCP listener socket on localhost TCP port 23 ( telnet )

    Create a UDP Server
    # nc -v -l -u -p 23
    this will create a UDP listener socket on localhost UDP port 23




    Netcat Readme file

    Netcat 1.10
    ===========							   /\_/\
    								  / 0 0 \
    Netcat is a simple Unix utility which reads and writes data	 ====v====
    across network connections, using TCP or UDP protocol.		  \  W  /
    It is designed to be a reliable "back-end" tool that can	  |     |     _
    be used directly or easily driven by other programs and		  / ___ \    /
    scripts.  At the same time, it is a feature-rich network	 / /   \ \  |
    debugging and exploration tool, since it can create almost	(((-----)))-'
    any kind of connection you would need and has several		 /
    interesting built-in capabilities.  Netcat, or "nc" as the	(      ___
    actual program is named, should have been supplied long ago	 \__.=|___E
    as another one of those cryptic but standard Unix tools.	        /
    
    In the simplest usage, "nc host port" creates a TCP connection to the given
    port on the given target host.  Your standard input is then sent to the host,
    and anything that comes back across the connection is sent to your standard
    output.  This continues indefinitely, until the network side of the connection
    shuts down.  Note that this behavior is different from most other applications
    which shut everything down and exit after an end-of-file on the standard input.
    
    Netcat can also function as a server, by listening for inbound connections
    on arbitrary ports and then doing the same reading and writing.  With minor
    limitations, netcat doesn't really care if it runs in "client" or "server"
    mode -- it still shovels data back and forth until there isn't any more left.
    In either mode, shutdown can be forced after a configurable time of inactivity
    on the network side.
    
    And it can do this via UDP too, so netcat is possibly the "udp telnet-like"
    application you always wanted for testing your UDP-mode servers.  UDP, as the
    "U" implies, gives less reliable data transmission than TCP connections and
    some systems may have trouble sending large amounts of data that way, but it's
    still a useful capability to have.
    
    You may be asking "why not just use telnet to connect to arbitrary ports?"
    Valid question, and here are some reasons.  Telnet has the "standard input
    EOF" problem, so one must introduce calculated delays in driving scripts to
    allow network output to finish.  This is the main reason netcat stays running
    until the *network* side closes.  Telnet also will not transfer arbitrary
    binary data, because certain characters are interpreted as telnet options and
    are thus removed from the data stream.  Telnet also emits some of its
    diagnostic messages to standard output, where netcat keeps such things
    religiously separated from its *output* and will never modify any of the real
    data in transit unless you *really* want it to.  And of course telnet is
    incapable of listening for inbound connections, or using UDP instead.  Netcat
    doesn't have any of these limitations, is much smaller and faster than telnet,
    and has many other advantages.
    
    Some of netcat's major features are:
    
    	Outbound or inbound connections, TCP or UDP, to or from any ports
    	Full DNS forward/reverse checking, with appropriate warnings
    	Ability to use any local source port
    	Ability to use any locally-configured network source address
    	Built-in port-scanning capabilities, with randomizer
    	Built-in loose source-routing capability
    	Can read command line arguments from standard input
    	Slow-send mode, one line every N seconds
    	Hex dump of transmitted and received data
    	Optional ability to let another program service established connections
    	Optional telnet-options responder
    
    Efforts have been made to have netcat "do the right thing" in all its various
    modes.  If you believe that it is doing the wrong thing under whatever
    circumstances, please notify me and tell me how you think it should behave.
    If netcat is not able to do some task you think up, minor tweaks to the code
    will probably fix that.  It provides a basic and easily-modified template for
    writing other network applications, and I certainly encourage people to make
    custom mods and send in any improvements they make to it.  This is the second
    release; the overall differences from 1.00 are relatively minor and have mostly
    to do with portability and bugfixes.  Many people provided greatly appreciated
    fixes and comments on the 1.00 release.  Continued feedback from the Internet
    community is always welcome!
    
    Netcat is entirely my own creation, although plenty of other code was used as
    examples.  It is freely given away to the Internet community in the hope that
    it will be useful, with no restrictions except giving credit where it is due.
    No GPLs, Berkeley copyrights or any of that nonsense.  The author assumes NO
    responsibility for how anyone uses it.  If netcat makes you rich somehow and
    you're feeling generous, mail me a check.  If you are affiliated in any way
    with Microsoft Network, get a life.  Always ski in control.  Comments,
    questions, and patches to hobbit@avian.org.
    
    Building
    ========
    
    Compiling is fairly straightforward.  Examine the Makefile for a SYSTYPE that
    matches yours, and do "make <systype>".  The executable "nc" should appear.
    If there is no relevant SYSTYPE section, try "generic".  If you create new
    sections for generic.h and Makefile to support another platform, please follow
    the given format and mail back the diffs.
    
    There are a couple of other settable #defines in netcat.c, which you can
    include as DFLAGS="-DTHIS -DTHAT" to your "make" invocation without having to
    edit the Makefile.  See the following discussions for what they are and do.
    
    If you want to link against the resolver library on SunOS [recommended] and
    you have BIND 4.9.x, you may need to change XLIBS=-lresolv in the Makefile to
    XLIBS="-lresolv -l44bsd".
    
    Linux sys/time.h does not really support presetting of FD_SETSIZE; a harmless
    warning is issued.
    
    Some systems may warn about pointer types for signal().  No problem, though.
    
    Exploration of features
    =======================
    
    Where to begin?  Netcat is at the same time so simple and versatile, it's like
    trying to describe everything you can do with your Swiss Army knife.  This will
    go over the basics; you should also read the usage examples and notes later on
    which may give you even more ideas about what this sort of tool is good for.
    
    If no command arguments are given at all, netcat asks for them, reads a line
    from standard input, and breaks it up into arguments internally.  This can be
    useful when driving netcat from certain types of scripts, with the side effect
    of hiding your command line arguments from "ps" displays.
    
    The host argument can be a name or IP address.  If -n is specified, netcat
    will only accept numeric IP addresses and do no DNS lookups for anything.  If
    -n is not given and -v is turned on, netcat will do a full forward and reverse
    name and address lookup for the host, and warn you about the all-too-common
    problem of mismatched names in the DNS.  This often takes a little longer for
    connection setup, but is useful to know about.  There are circumstances under
    which this can *save* time, such as when you want to know the name for some IP
    address and also connect there.  Netcat will just tell you all about it, saving
    the manual steps of looking up the hostname yourself.  Normally mismatch-
    checking is case-insensitive per the DNS spec, but you can define ANAL at
    compile time to make it case-sensitive -- sometimes useful for uncovering minor
    errors in your own DNS files while poking around your networks.
    
    A port argument is required for outbound connections, and can be numeric or a
    name as listed in /etc/services.  If -n is specified, only numeric arguments
    are valid.  Special syntax and/or more than one port argument cause different
    behavior -- see details below about port-scanning.
    
    The -v switch controls the verbosity level of messages sent to standard error.
    You will probably want to run netcat most of the time with -v turned on, so you
    can see info about the connections it is trying to make.  You will probably
    also want to give a smallish -w argument, which limits the time spent trying to
    make a connection.  I usually alias "nc" to "nc -v -w 3", which makes it
    function just about the same for things I would otherwise use telnet to do.
    The timeout is easily changed by a subsequent -w argument which overrides the
    earlier one.  Specifying -v more than once makes diagnostic output MORE
    verbose.  If -v is not specified at all, netcat silently does its work unless
    some error happens, whereupon it describes the error and exits with a nonzero
    status.  Refused network connections are generally NOT considered to be errors,
    unless you only asked for a single TCP port and it was refused.
    
    Note that -w also sets the network inactivity timeout.  This does not have any
    effect until standard input closes, but then if nothing further arrives from
    the network in the next <timeout> seconds, netcat tries to read the net once
    more for good measure, and then closes and exits.  There are a lot of network
    services now that accept a small amount of input and return a large amount of
    output, such as Gopher and Web servers, which is the main reason netcat was
    written to "block" on the network staying open rather than standard input.
    Handling the timeout this way gives uniform behavior with network servers that
    *don't* close by themselves until told to.
    
    UDP connections are opened instead of TCP when -u is specified.  These aren't
    really "connections" per se since UDP is a connectionless protocol, although
    netcat does internally use the "connected UDP socket" mechanism that most
    kernels support.  Although netcat claims that an outgoing UDP connection is
    "open" immediately, no data is sent until something is read from standard
    input.  Only thereafter is it possible to determine whether there really is a
    UDP server on the other end, and often you just can't tell.  Most UDP protocols
    use timeouts and retries to do their thing and in many cases won't bother
    answering at all, so you should specify a timeout and hope for the best.  You
    will get more out of UDP connections if standard input is fed from a source
    of data that looks like various kinds of server requests.
    
    To obtain a hex dump file of the data sent either way, use "-o logfile".  The
    dump lines begin with "<" or ">" to respectively indicate "from the net" or
    "to the net", and contain the total count per direction, and hex and ascii
    representations of the traffic.  Capturing a hex dump naturally slows netcat
    down a bit, so don't use it where speed is critical.
    
    Netcat can bind to any local port, subject to privilege restrictions and ports
    that are already in use.  It is also possible to use a specific local network
    source address if it is that of a network interface on your machine.  [Note:
    this does not work correctly on all platforms.]  Use "-p portarg" to grab a
    specific local port, and "-s ip-addr" or "-s name" to have that be your source
    IP address.  This is often referred to as "anchoring the socket".  Root users
    can grab any unused source port including the "reserved" ones less than 1024.
    Absence of -p will bind to whatever unused port the system gives you, just like
    any other normal client connection, unless you use -r [see below].
    
    Listen mode will cause netcat to wait for an inbound connection, and then the
    same data transfer happens.  Thus, you can do "nc -l -p 1234 < filename" and
    when someone else connects to your port 1234, the file is sent to them whether
    they wanted it or not.  Listen mode is generally used along with a local port
    argument -- this is required for UDP mode, while TCP mode can have the system
    assign one and tell you what it is if -v is turned on.  If you specify a target
    host and optional port in listen mode, netcat will accept an inbound connection
    only from that host and if you specify one, only from that foreign source port.
    In verbose mode you'll be informed about the inbound connection, including what
    address and port it came from, and since listening on "any" applies to several
    possibilities, which address it came *to* on your end.  If the system supports
    IP socket options, netcat will attempt to retrieve any such options from an
    inbound connection and print them out in hex.
    
    If netcat is compiled with -DGAPING_SECURITY_HOLE, the -e argument specifies
    a program to exec after making or receiving a successful connection.  In the
    listening mode, this works similarly to "inetd" but only for a single instance.
    Use with GREAT CARE.  This piece of the code is normally not enabled; if you
    know what you're doing, have fun.  This hack also works in UDP mode.  Note that
    you can only supply -e with the name of the program, but no arguments.  If you
    want to launch something with an argument list, write a two-line wrapper script
    or just use inetd like always.
    
    If netcat is compiled with -DTELNET, the -t argument enables it to respond
    to telnet option negotiation [always in the negative, i.e. DONT or WONT].
    This allows it to connect to a telnetd and get past the initial negotiation
    far enough to get a login prompt from the server.  Since this feature has
    the potential to modify the data stream, it is not enabled by default.  You
    have to understand why you might need this and turn on the #define yourself.
    
    Data from the network connection is always delivered to standard output as
    efficiently as possible, using large 8K reads and writes.  Standard input is
    normally sent to the net the same way, but the -i switch specifies an "interval
    time" which slows this down considerably.  Standard input is still read in
    large batches, but netcat then tries to find where line breaks exist and sends
    one line every interval time.  Note that if standard input is a terminal, data
    is already read line by line, so unless you make the -i interval rather long,
    what you type will go out at a fairly normal rate.  -i is really designed
    for use when you want to "measure out" what is read from files or pipes.
    
    Port-scanning is a popular method for exploring what's out there.  Netcat
    accepts its commands with options first, then the target host, and everything
    thereafter is interpreted as port names or numbers, or ranges of ports in M-N
    syntax.  CAVEAT: some port names in /etc/services contain hyphens -- netcat
    currently will not correctly parse those, so specify ranges using numbers if
    you can.  If more than one port is thus specified, netcat connects to *all* of
    them, sending the same batch of data from standard input [up to 8K worth] to
    each one that is successfully connected to.  Specifying multiple ports also
    suppresses diagnostic messages about refused connections, unless -v is
    specified twice for "more verbosity".  This way you normally get notified only
    about genuinely open connections.  Example: "nc -v -w 2 -z target 20-30" will
    try connecting to every port between 20 and 30 [inclusive] at the target, and
    will likely inform you about an FTP server, telnet server, and mailer along the
    way.  The -z switch prevents sending any data to a TCP connection and very
    limited probe data to a UDP connection, and is thus useful as a fast scanning
    mode just to see what ports the target is listening on.  To limit scanning
    speed if desired, -i will insert a delay between each port probe.  There are
    some pitfalls with regard to UDP scanning, described later, but in general it
    works well.
    
    For each range of ports specified, scanning is normally done downward within
    that range.  If the -r switch is used, scanning hops randomly around within
    that range and reports open ports as it finds them.  [If you want them listed
    in order regardless, pipe standard error through "sort"...]  In addition, if
    random mode is in effect, the local source ports are also randomized.  This
    prevents netcat from exhibiting any kind of regular pattern in its scanning.
    You can exert fairly fine control over your scan by judicious use of -r and
    selected port ranges to cover.  If you use -r for a single connection, the
    source port will have a random value above 8192, rather than the next one the
    kernel would have assigned you.  Note that selecting a specific local port
    with -p overrides any local-port randomization.
    
    Many people are interested in testing network connectivity using IP source
    routing, even if it's only to make sure their own firewalls are blocking
    source-routed packets.  On systems that support it, the -g switch can be used
    multiple times [up to 8] to construct a loose-source-routed path for your
    connection, and the -G argument positions the "hop pointer" within the list.
    If your network allows source-routed traffic in and out, you can test
    connectivity to your own services via remote points in the internet.  Note that
    although newer BSD-flavor telnets also have source-routing capability, it isn't
    clearly documented and the command syntax is somewhat clumsy.  Netcat's
    handling of "-g" is modeled after "traceroute".
    
    Netcat tries its best to behave just like "cat".  It currently does nothing to
    terminal input modes, and does no end-of-line conversion.  Standard input from
    a terminal is read line by line with normal editing characters in effect.  You
    can freely suspend out of an interactive connection and resume.  ^C or whatever
    your interrupt character is will make netcat close the network connection and
    exit.  A switch to place the terminal in raw mode has been considered, but so
    far has not been necessary.  You can send raw binary data by reading it out of
    a file or piping from another program, so more meaningful effort would be spent
    writing an appropriate front-end driver.
    
    Netcat is not an "arbitrary packet generator", but the ability to talk to raw
    sockets and/or nit/bpf/dlpi may appear at some point.  Such things are clearly
    useful; I refer you to Darren Reed's excellent ip_filter package, which now
    includes a tool to construct and send raw packets with any contents you want.
    
    Example uses -- the light side
    ==============================
    
    Again, this is a very partial list of possibilities, but it may get you to
    think up more applications for netcat.  Driving netcat with simple shell or
    expect scripts is an easy and flexible way to do fairly complex tasks,
    especially if you're not into coding network tools in C.  My coding isn't
    particularly strong either [although undoubtedly better after writing this
    thing!], so I tend to construct bare-metal tools like this that I can trivially
    plug into other applications.  Netcat doubles as a teaching tool -- one can
    learn a great deal about more complex network protocols by trying to simulate
    them through raw connections!
    
    An example of netcat as a backend for something else is the shell-script
    Web browser, which simply asks for the relevant parts of a URL and pipes
    "GET /what/ever" into a netcat connection to the server.  I used to do this
    with telnet, and had to use calculated sleep times and other stupidity to
    kludge around telnet's limitations.  Netcat guarantees that I get the whole
    page, and since it transfers all the data unmodified, I can even pull down
    binary image files and display them elsewhere later.  Some folks may find the
    idea of a shell-script web browser silly and strange, but it starts up and
    gets me my info a hell of a lot faster than a GUI browser and doesn't hide
    any contents of links and forms and such.  This is included, as scripts/web,
    along with several other web-related examples.
    
    Netcat is an obvious replacement for telnet as a tool for talking to daemons.
    For example, it is easier to type "nc host 25", talk to someone's mailer, and
    just ^C out than having to type ^]c or QUIT as telnet would require you to do.
    You can quickly catalog the services on your network by telling netcat to
    connect to well-known services and collect greetings, or at least scan for open
    ports.  You'll probably want to collect netcat's diagnostic messages in your
    output files, so be sure to include standard error in the output using
    `>& file' in *csh or `> file 2>&1' in bourne shell.
    
    A scanning example: "echo QUIT | nc -v -w 5 target 20-250 500-600 5990-7000"
    will inform you about a target's various well-known TCP servers, including
    r-services, X, IRC, and maybe a few you didn't expect.  Sending in QUIT and
    using the timeout will almost guarantee that you see some kind of greeting or
    error from each service, which usually indicates what it is and what version.
    [Beware of the "chargen" port, though...]  SATAN uses exactly this technique to
    collect host information, and indeed some of the ideas herein were taken from
    the SATAN backend tools.  If you script this up to try every host in your
    subnet space and just let it run, you will not only see all the services,
    you'll find out about hosts that aren't correctly listed in your DNS.  Then you
    can compare new snapshots against old snapshots to see changes.  For going
    after particular services, a more intrusive example is in scripts/probe.
    
    Netcat can be used as a simple data transfer agent, and it doesn't really
    matter which end is the listener and which end is the client -- input at one
    side arrives at the other side as output.  It is helpful to start the listener
    at the receiving side with no timeout specified, and then give the sending side
    a small timeout.  That way the listener stays listening until you contact it,
    and after data stops flowing the client will time out, shut down, and take the
    listener with it.  Unless the intervening network is fraught with problems,
    this should be completely reliable, and you can always increase the timeout.  A
    typical example of something "rsh" is often used for: on one side,
    
    	nc -l -p 1234 | uncompress -c | tar xvfp -
    
    and then on the other side
    
    	tar cfp - /some/dir | compress -c | nc -w 3 othermachine 1234
    
    will transfer the contents of a directory from one machine to another, without
    having to worry about .rhosts files, user accounts, or inetd configurations
    at either end.  Again, it matters not which is the listener or receiver; the
    "tarring" machine could just as easily be running the listener instead.  One
    could conceivably use a scheme like this for backups, by having cron-jobs fire
    up listeners and backup handlers [which can be restricted to specific addresses
    and ports between each other] and pipe "dump" or "tar" on one machine to "dd
    of=/dev/tapedrive" on another as usual.  Since netcat returns a nonzero exit
    status for a denied listener connection, scripts to handle such tasks could
    easily log and reject connect attempts from third parties, and then retry.
    
    Another simple data-transfer example: shipping things to a PC that doesn't have
    any network applications yet except a TCP stack and a web browser.  Point the
    browser at an arbitrary port on a Unix server by telling it to download
    something like http://unixbox:4444/foo, and have a listener on the Unix side
    ready to ship out a file when the connect comes in.  The browser may pervert
    binary data when told to save the URL, but you can dig the raw data out of
    the on-disk cache.
    
    If you build netcat with GAPING_SECURITY_HOLE defined, you can use it as an
    "inetd" substitute to test experimental network servers that would otherwise
    run under "inetd".  A script or program will have its input and output hooked
    to the network the same way, perhaps sans some fancier signal handling.  Given
    that most network services do not bind to a particular local address, whether
    they are under "inetd" or not, it is possible for netcat avoid the "address
    already in use" error by binding to a specific address.  This lets you [as
    root, for low ports] place netcat "in the way" of a standard service, since
    inbound connections are generally sent to such specifically-bound listeners
    first and fall back to the ones bound to "any".  This allows for a one-off
    experimental simulation of some service, without having to screw around with
    inetd.conf.  Running with -v turned on and collecting a connection log from
    standard error is recommended.
    
    Netcat as well can make an outbound connection and then run a program or script
    on the originating end, with input and output connected to the same network
    port.  This "inverse inetd" capability could enhance the backup-server concept
    described above or help facilitate things such as a "network dialback" concept.
    The possibilities are many and varied here; if such things are intended as
    security mechanisms, it may be best to modify netcat specifically for the
    purpose instead of wrapping such functions in scripts.
    
    Speaking of inetd, netcat will function perfectly well *under* inetd as a TCP
    connection redirector for inbound services, like a "plug-gw" without the
    authentication step.  This is very useful for doing stuff like redirecting
    traffic through your firewall out to other places like web servers and mail
    hubs, while posing no risk to the firewall machine itself.  Put netcat behind
    inetd and tcp_wrappers, perhaps thusly:
    
    	www stream tcp nowait nobody /etc/tcpd /bin/nc -w 3 realwww 80
    
    and you have a simple and effective "application relay" with access control
    and logging.  Note use of the wait time as a "safety" in case realwww isn't
    reachable or the calling user aborts the connection -- otherwise the relay may
    hang there forever.
    
    You can use netcat to generate huge amounts of useless network data for
    various performance testing.  For example, doing
    
    	yes AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA | nc -v -v -l -p 2222 > /dev/null
    
    on one side and then hitting it with
    
    	yes BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB | nc othermachine 2222 > /dev/null
    
    from another host will saturate your wires with A's and B's.  The "very
    verbose" switch usage will tell you how many of each were sent and received
    after you interrupt either side.  Using UDP mode produces tremendously MORE
    trash per unit time in the form of fragmented 8 Kbyte mobygrams -- enough to
    stress-test kernels and network interfaces.  Firing random binary data into
    various network servers may help expose bugs in their input handling, which
    nowadays is a popular thing to explore.  A simple example data-generator is
    given in data/data.c included in this package, along with a small collection
    of canned input files to generate various packet contents.  This program is
    documented in its beginning comments, but of interest here is using "%r" to
    generate random bytes at well-chosen points in a data stream.  If you can
    crash your daemon, you likely have a security problem.
    
    The hex dump feature may be useful for debugging odd network protocols,
    especially if you don't have any network monitoring equipment handy or aren't
    root where you'd need to run "tcpdump" or something.  Bind a listening netcat
    to a local port, and have it run a script which in turn runs another netcat
    to the real service and captures the hex dump to a log file.  This sets up a
    transparent relay between your local port and wherever the real service is.
    Be sure that the script-run netcat does *not* use -v, or the extra info it
    sends to standard error may confuse the protocol.  Note also that you cannot
    have the "listen/exec" netcat do the data capture, since once the connection
    arrives it is no longer netcat that is running.
    
    Binding to an arbitrary local port allows you to simulate things like r-service
    clients, if you are root locally.  For example, feeding "^@root^@joe^@pwd^@"
    [where ^@ is a null, and root/joe could be any other local/remote username
    pair] into a "rsh" or "rlogin" server, FROM your port 1023 for example,
    duplicates what the server expects to receive.  Thus, you can test for insecure
    .rhosts files around your network without having to create new user accounts on
    your client machine.  The program data/rservice.c can aid this process by
    constructing the "rcmd" protocol bytes.  Doing this also prevents "rshd" from
    trying to create that separate standard-error socket and still gives you an
    input path, as opposed to the usual action of "rsh -n".  Using netcat for
    things like this can be really useful sometimes, because rsh and rlogin
    generally want a host *name* as an argument and won't accept IP addresses.  If
    your client-end DNS is hosed, as may be true when you're trying to extract
    backup sets on to a dumb client, "netcat -n" wins where normal rsh/rlogin is
    useless.
    
    If you are unsure that a remote syslogger is working, test it with netcat.
    Make a UDP connection to port 514 and type in "<0>message", which should
    correspond to "kern.emerg" and cause syslogd to scream into every file it has
    open [and possibly all over users' terminals].  You can tame this down by
    using a different number and use netcat inside routine scripts to send syslog
    messages to places that aren't configured in syslog.conf.  For example,
    "echo '<38>message' | nc -w 1 -u loggerhost 514" should send to auth.notice
    on loggerhost.  The exact number may vary; check against your syslog.h first.
    
    Netcat provides several ways for you to test your own packet filters.  If you
    bind to a port normally protected against outside access and make a connection
    to somewhere outside your own network, the return traffic will be coming to
    your chosen port from the "outside" and should be blocked.  TCP may get through
    if your filter passes all "ack syn", but it shouldn't be even doing that to low
    ports on your network.  Remember to test with UDP traffic as well!  If your
    filter passes at least outbound source-routed IP packets, bouncing a connection
    back to yourself via some gateway outside your network will create "incoming"
    traffic with your source address, which should get dropped by a correctly
    configured anti-spoofing filter.  This is a "non-test" if you're also dropping
    source-routing, but it's good to be able to test for that too.  Any packet
    filter worth its salt will be blocking source-routed packets in both
    directions, but you never know what interesting quirks you might turn up by
    playing around with source ports and addresses and watching the wires with a
    network monitor.
    
    You can use netcat to protect your own workstation's X server against outside
    access.  X is stupid enough to listen for connections on "any" and never tell
    you when new connections arrive, which is one reason it is so vulnerable.  Once
    you have all your various X windows up and running you can use netcat to bind
    just to your ethernet address and listen to port 6000.  Any new connections
    from outside the machine will hit netcat instead your X server, and you get a
    log of who's trying.  You can either tell netcat to drop the connection, or
    perhaps run another copy of itself to relay to your actual X server on
    "localhost".  This may not work for dedicated X terminals, but it may be
    possible to authorize your X terminal only for its boot server, and run a relay
    netcat over on the server that will in turn talk to your X terminal.  Since
    netcat only handles one listening connection per run, make sure that whatever
    way you rig it causes another one to run and listen on 6000 soon afterward, or
    your real X server will be reachable once again.  A very minimal script just
    to protect yourself could be
    
    	while true ; do
    	  nc -v -l -s <your-addr> -p 6000 localhost 2
    	done
    
    which causes netcat to accept and then close any inbound connection to your
    workstation's normal ethernet address, and another copy is immediately run by
    the script.  Send standard error to a file for a log of connection attempts.
    If your system can't do the "specific bind" thing all is not lost; run your
    X server on display ":1" or port 6001, and netcat can still function as a probe
    alarm by listening on 6000.
    
    Does your shell-account provider allow personal Web pages, but not CGI scripts?
    You can have netcat listen on a particular port to execute a program or script
    of your choosing, and then just point to the port with a URL in your homepage.
    The listener could even exist on a completely different machine, avoiding the
    potential ire of the homepage-host administrators.  Since the script will get
    the raw browser query as input it won't look like a typical CGI script, and
    since it's running under your UID you need to write it carefully.  You may want
    to write a netcat-based script as a wrapper that reads a query and sets up
    environment variables for a regular CGI script.  The possibilities for using
    netcat and scripts to handle Web stuff are almost endless.  Again, see the
    examples under scripts/.
    
    Example uses -- the dark side
    =============================
    
    Equal time is deserved here, since a versatile tool like this can be useful
    to any Shade of Hat.  I could use my Victorinox to either fix your car or
    disassemble it, right?  You can clearly use something like netcat to attack
    or defend -- I don't try to govern anyone's social outlook, I just build tools.
    Regardless of your intentions, you should still be aware of these threats to
    your own systems.
    
    The first obvious thing is scanning someone *else's* network for vulnerable
    services.  Files containing preconstructed data, be it exploratory or
    exploitive, can be fed in as standard input, including command-line arguments
    to netcat itself to keep "ps" ignorant of your doings.  The more random the
    scanning, the less likelihood of detection by humans, scan-detectors, or
    dynamic filtering, and with -i you'll wait longer but avoid loading down the
    target's network.  Some examples for crafting various standard UDP probes are
    given in data/*.d.
    
    Some configurations of packet filters attempt to solve the FTP-data problem by
    just allowing such connections from the outside.  These come FROM port 20, TO
    high TCP ports inside -- if you locally bind to port 20, you may find yourself
    able to bypass filtering in some cases.  Maybe not to low ports "inside", but
    perhaps to TCP NFS servers, X servers, Prospero, ciscos that listen on 200x
    and 400x...  Similar bypassing may be possible for UDP [and maybe TCP too] if a
    connection comes from port 53; a filter may assume it's a nameserver response.
    
    Using -e in conjunction with binding to a specific address can enable "server
    takeover" by getting in ahead of the real ones, whereupon you can snarf data
    sent in and feed your own back out.  At the very least you can log a hex dump
    of someone else's session.  If you are root, you can certainly use -s and -e to
    run various hacked daemons without having to touch inetd.conf or the real
    daemons themselves.  You may not always have the root access to deal with low
    ports, but what if you are on a machine that also happens to be an NFS server?
    You might be able to collect some interesting things from port 2049, including
    local file handles.  There are several other servers that run on high ports
    that are likely candidates for takeover, including many of the RPC services on
    some platforms [yppasswdd, anyone?].  Kerberos tickets, X cookies, and IRC
    traffic also come to mind.  RADIUS-based terminal servers connect incoming
    users to shell-account machines on a high port, usually 1642 or thereabouts.
    SOCKS servers run on 1080.  Do "netstat -a" and get creative.
    
    There are some daemons that are well-written enough to bind separately to all
    the local interfaces, possibly with an eye toward heading off this sort of
    problem.  Named from recent BIND releases, and NTP, are two that come to mind.
    Netstat will show these listening on address.53 instead of *.53.  You won't
    be able to get in front of these on any of the real interface addresses, which
    of course is especially interesting in the case of named, but these servers
    sometimes forget about things like "alias" interface addresses or interfaces
    that appear later on such as dynamic PPP links.  There are some hacked web
    servers and versions of "inetd" floating around that specifically bind as well,
    based on a configuration file -- these generally *are* bound to alias addresses
    to offer several different address-based services from one machine.
    
    Using -e to start a remote backdoor shell is another obvious sort of thing,
    easier than constructing a file for inetd to listen on "ingreslock" or
    something, and you can access-control it against other people by specifying a
    client host and port.  Experience with this truly demonstrates how fragile the
    barrier between being "logged in" or not really is, and is further expressed by
    scripts/bsh.  If you're already behind a firewall, it may be easier to make an
    *outbound* connection and then run a shell; a small wrapper script can
    periodically try connecting to a known place and port, you can later listen
    there until the inbound connection arrives, and there's your shell.  Running
    a shell via UDP has several interesting features, although be aware that once
    "connected", the UDP stub sockets tend to show up in "netstat" just like TCP
    connections and may not be quite as subtle as you wanted.  Packets may also be
    lost, so use TCP if you need reliable connections.  But since UDP is
    connectionless, a hookup of this sort will stick around almost forever, even if
    you ^C out of netcat or do a reboot on your side, and you only need to remember
    the ports you used on both ends to reestablish.  And outbound UDP-plus-exec
    connection creates the connected socket and starts the program immediately.  On
    a listening UDP connection, the socket is created once a first packet is
    received.  In either case, though, such a "connection" has the interesting side
    effect that only your client-side IP address and [chosen?] source port will
    thereafter be able to talk to it.  Instant access control!  A non-local third
    party would have to do ALL of the following to take over such a session:
    
    	forge UDP with your source address [trivial to do; see below]
    	guess the port numbers of BOTH ends, or sniff the wire for them
    	arrange to block ICMP or UDP return traffic between it and your real
    	  source, so the session doesn't die with a network write error.
    
    The companion program data/rservice.c is helpful in scripting up any sort of
    r-service username or password guessing attack.  The arguments to "rservice"
    are simply the strings that get null-terminated and passed over an "rcmd"-style
    connection, with the assumption that the client does not need a separate
    standard-error port.  Brute-force password banging is best done via "rexec" if
    it is available since it is less likely to log failed attempts.  Thus, doing
    "rservice joe joespass pwd | nc target exec" should return joe's home dir if
    the password is right, or "Permission denied."  Plug in a dictionary and go to
    town.  If you're attacking rsh/rlogin, remember to be root and bind to a port
    between 512 and 1023 on your end, and pipe in "rservice joe joe pwd" and such.
    
    Netcat can prevent inadvertently sending extra information over a telnet
    connection.  Use "nc -t" in place of telnet, and daemons that try to ask for
    things like USER and TERM environment variables will get no useful answers, as
    they otherwise would from a more recent telnet program.  Some telnetds actually
    try to collect this stuff and then plug the USER variable into "login" so that
    the caller is then just asked for a password!  This mechanism could cause a
    login attempt as YOUR real username to be logged over there if you use a
    Borman-based telnet instead of "nc -t".
    
    Got an unused network interface configured in your kernel [e.g. SLIP], or
    support for alias addresses?  Ifconfig one to be any address you like, and bind
    to it with -s to enable all sorts of shenanigans with bogus source addresses.
    The interface probably has to be UP before this works; some SLIP versions
    need a far-end address before this is true.  Hammering on UDP services is then
    a no-brainer.  What you can do to an unfiltered syslog daemon should be fairly
    obvious; trimming the conf file can help protect against it.  Many routers out
    there still blindly believe what they receive via RIP and other routing
    protocols.  Although most UDP echo and chargen servers check if an incoming
    packet was sent from *another* "internal" UDP server, there are many that still
    do not, any two of which [or many, for that matter] could keep each other
    entertained for hours at the expense of bandwidth.  And you can always make
    someone wonder why she's being probed by nsa.gov.
    
    Your TCP spoofing possibilities are mostly limited to destinations you can
    source-route to while locally bound to your phony address.  Many sites block
    source-routed packets these days for precisely this reason.  If your kernel
    does oddball things when sending source-routed packets, try moving the pointer
    around with -G.  You may also have to fiddle with the routing on your own
    machine before you start receiving packets back.  Warning: some machines still
    send out traffic using the source address of the outbound interface, regardless
    of your binding, especially in the case of localhost.  Check first.  If you can
    open a connection but then get no data back from it, the target host is
    probably killing the IP options on its end [this is an option inside TCP
    wrappers and several other packages], which happens after the 3-way handshake
    is completed.  If you send some data and observe the "send-q" side of "netstat"
    for that connection increasing but never getting sent, that's another symptom.
    Beware: if Sendmail 8.7.x detects a source-routed SMTP connection, it extracts
    the hop list and sticks it in the Received: header!
    
    SYN bombing [sometimes called "hosing"] can disable many TCP servers, and if
    you hit one often enough, you can keep it unreachable for days.  As is true of
    many other denial-of-service attacks, there is currently no defense against it
    except maybe at the human level.  Making kernel SOMAXCONN considerably larger
    than the default and the half-open timeout smaller can help, and indeed some
    people running large high-performance web servers have *had* to do that just to
    handle normal traffic.  Taking out mailers and web servers is sociopathic, but
    on the other hand it is sometimes useful to be able to, say, disable a site's
    identd daemon for a few minutes.  If someone realizes what is going on,
    backtracing will still be difficult since the packets have a phony source
    address, but calls to enough ISP NOCs might eventually pinpoint the source.
    It is also trivial for a clueful ISP to watch for or even block outgoing
    packets with obviously fake source addresses, but as we know many of them are
    not clueful or willing to get involved in such hassles.  Besides, outbound
    packets with an [otherwise unreachable] source address in one of their net
    blocks would look fairly legitimate.
    
    Notes
    =====
    
    A discussion of various caveats, subtleties, and the design of the innards.
    
    As of version 1.07 you can construct a single file containing command arguments
    and then some data to transfer.  Netcat is now smart enough to pick out the
    first line and build the argument list, and send any remaining data across the
    net to one or multiple ports.  The first release of netcat had trouble with
    this -- it called fgets() for the command line argument, which behind the
    scenes does a large read() from standard input, perhaps 4096 bytes or so, and
    feeds that out to the fgets() library routine.  By the time netcat 1.00 started
    directly read()ing stdin for more data, 4096 bytes of it were gone.  It now
    uses raw read() everywhere and does the right thing whether reading from files,
    pipes, or ttys.  If you use this for multiple-port connections, the single
    block of data will now be a maximum of 8K minus the first line.  Improvements
    have been made to the logic in sending the saved chunk to each new port.  Note
    that any command-line arguments hidden using this mechanism could still be
    extracted from a core dump.
    
    When netcat receives an inbound UDP connection, it creates a "connected socket"
    back to the source of the connection so that it can also send out data using
    normal write().  Using this mechanism instead of recvfrom/sendto has several
    advantages -- the read/write select loop is simplified, and ICMP errors can in
    effect be received by non-root users.  However, it has the subtle side effect
    that if further UDP packets arrive from the caller but from different source
    ports, the listener will not receive them.  UDP listen mode on a multihomed
    machine may have similar quirks unless you specifically bind to one of its
    addresses.  It is not clear that kernel support for UDP connected sockets
    and/or my understanding of it is entirely complete here, so experiment...
    
    You should be aware of some subtleties concerning UDP scanning.  If -z is on,
    netcat attempts to send a single null byte to the target port, twice, with a
    small time in between.  You can either use the -w timeout, or netcat will try
    to make a "sideline" TCP connection to the target to introduce a small time
    delay equal to the round-trip time between you and the target.  Note that if
    you have a -w timeout and -i timeout set, BOTH take effect and you wait twice
    as long.  The TCP connection is to a normally refused port to minimize traffic,
    but if you notice a UDP fast-scan taking somewhat longer than it should, it
    could be that the target is actually listening on the TCP port.  Either way,
    any ICMP port-unreachable messages from the target should have arrived in the
    meantime.  The second single-byte UDP probe is then sent.  Under BSD kernels,
    the ICMP error is delivered to the "connected socket" and the second write
    returns an error, which tells netcat that there is NOT a UDP service there.
    While Linux seems to be a fortunate exception, under many SYSV derived kernels
    the ICMP is not delivered, and netcat starts reporting that *all* the ports are
    "open" -- clearly wrong.  [Some systems may not even *have* the "udp connected
    socket" concept, and netcat in its current form will not work for UDP at all.]
    If -z is specified and only one UDP port is probed, netcat's exit status
    reflects whether the connection was "open" or "refused" as with TCP.
    
    It may also be that UDP packets are being blocked by filters with no ICMP error
    returns, in which case everything will time out and return "open".  This all
    sounds backwards, but that's how UDP works.  If you're not sure, try "echo
    w00gumz | nc -u -w 2 target 7" to see if you can reach its UDP echo port at
    all.  You should have no trouble using a BSD-flavor system to scan for UDP
    around your own network, although flooding a target with the high activity that
    -z generates will cause it to occasionally drop packets and indicate false
    "opens".  A more "correct" way to do this is collect and analyze the ICMP
    errors, as does SATAN's "udp_scan" backend, but then again there's no guarantee
    that the ICMP gets back to you either.  Udp_scan also does the zero-byte
    probes but is excruciatingly careful to calculate its own round-trip timing
    average and dynamically set its own response timeouts along with decoding any
    ICMP received.  Netcat uses a much sleazier method which is nonetheless quite
    effective.  Cisco routers are known to have a "dead time" in between ICMP
    responses about unreachable UDP ports, so a fast scan of a cisco will show
    almost everything "open".  If you are looking for a specific UDP service, you
    can construct a file containing the right bytes to trigger a response from the
    other end and send that as standard input.  Netcat will read up to 8K of the
    file and send the same data to every UDP port given.  Note that you must use a
    timeout in this case [as would any other UDP client application] since the
    two-write probe only happens if -z is specified.
    
    Many telnet servers insist on a specific set of option negotiations before
    presenting a login banner.  On a raw connection you will see this as small
    amount of binary gook.  My attempts to create fixed input bytes to make a
    telnetd happy worked some places but failed against newer BSD-flavor ones,
    possibly due to timing problems, but there are a couple of much better
    workarounds.  First, compile with -DTELNET and use -t if you just want to get
    past the option negotiation and talk to something on a telnet port.  You will
    still see the binary gook -- in fact you'll see a lot more of it as the options
    are responded to behind the scenes.  The telnet responder does NOT update the
    total byte count, or show up in the hex dump -- it just responds negatively to
    any options read from the incoming data stream.  If you want to use a normal
    full-blown telnet to get to something but also want some of netcat's features
    involved like settable ports or timeouts, construct a tiny "foo" script:
    
    	#! /bin/sh
    	exec nc -otheroptions targethost 23
    
    and then do
    
    	nc -l -p someport -e foo localhost &
    	telnet localhost someport
    
    and your telnet should connect transparently through the exec'ed netcat to
    the target, using whatever options you supplied in the "foo" script.  Don't
    use -t inside the script, or you'll wind up sending *two* option responses.
    
    I've observed inconsistent behavior under some Linuxes [perhaps just older
    ones?] when binding in listen mode.  Sometimes netcat binds only to "localhost"
    if invoked with no address or port arguments, and sometimes it is unable to
    bind to a specific address for listening if something else is already listening
    on "any".  The former problem can be worked around by specifying "-s 0.0.0.0",
    which will do the right thing despite netcat claiming that it's listening on
    [127.0.0.1].  This is a known problem -- for example, there's a mention of it
    in the makefile for SOCKS.  On the flip side, binding to localhost and sending
    packets to some other machine doesn't work as you'd expect -- they go out with
    the source address of the sending interface instead.  The Linux kernel contains
    a specific check to ensure that packets from 127.0.0.1 are never sent to the
    wire; other kernels may contain similar code.  Linux, of course, *still*
    doesn't support source-routing, but they claim that it and many other network
    improvements are at least breathing hard.
    
    There are several possible errors associated with making TCP connections, but
    to specifically see anything other than "refused", one must wait the full
    kernel-defined timeout for a connection to fail.  Netcat's mechanism of
    wrapping an alarm timer around the connect prevents the *real* network error
    from being returned -- "errno" at that point indicates "interrupted system
    call" since the connect attempt was interrupted.  Some old 4.3 BSD kernels
    would actually return things like "host unreachable" immediately if that was
    the case, but most newer kernels seem to wait the full timeout and *then* pass
    back the real error.  Go figure.  In this case, I'd argue that the old way was
    better, despite those same kernels generally being the ones that tear down
    *established* TCP connections when ICMP-bombed.
    
    Incoming socket options are passed to applications by the kernel in the
    kernel's own internal format.  The socket-options structure for source-routing
    contains the "first-hop" IP address first, followed by the rest of the real
    options list.  The kernel uses this as is when sending reply packets -- the
    structure is therefore designed to be more useful to the kernel than to humans,
    but the hex dump of it that netcat produces is still useful to have.
    
    Kernels treat source-routing options somewhat oddly, but it sort of makes sense
    once one understands what's going on internally.  The options list of addresses
    must contain hop1, hop2, ..., destination.  When a source-routed packet is sent
    by the kernel [at least BSD], the actual destination address becomes irrelevant
    because it is replaced with "hop1", "hop1" is removed from the options list,
    and all the other addresses in the list are shifted up to fill the hole.  Thus
    the outbound packet is sent from your chosen source address to the first
    *gateway*, and the options list now contains hop2, ..., destination.  During
    all this address shuffling, the kernel does NOT change the pointer value, which
    is why it is useful to be able to set the pointer yourself -- you can construct
    some really bizarre return paths, and send your traffic fairly directly to the
    target but around some larger loop on the way back.  Some Sun kernels seem to
    never flip the source-route around if it contains less than three hops, never
    reset the pointer anyway, and tries to send the packet [with options containing
    a "completed" source route!!] directly back to the source.  This is way broken,
    of course.  [Maybe ipforwarding has to be on?  I haven't had an opportunity to
    beat on it thoroughly yet.]
    
    "Credits" section: The original idea for netcat fell out of a long-standing
    desire and fruitless search for a tool resembling it and having the same
    features.  After reading some other network code and realizing just how many
    cool things about sockets could be controlled by the calling user, I started
    on the basics and the rest fell together pretty quickly.  Some port-scanning
    ideas were taken from Venema/Farmer's SATAN tool kit, and Pluvius' "pscan"
    utility.  Healthy amounts of BSD kernel source were perused in an attempt to
    dope out socket options and source-route handling; additional help was obtained
    from Dave Borman's telnet sources.  The select loop is loosely based on fairly
    well-known code from "rsh" and Richard Stevens' "sock" program [which itself is
    sort of a "netcat" with more obscure features], with some more paranoid
    sanity-checking thrown in to guard against the distinct likelihood that there
    are subtleties about such things I still don't understand.  I found the
    argument-hiding method cleanly implemented in Barrett's "deslogin"; reading the
    line as input allows greater versatility and is much less prone to cause
    bizarre problems than the more common trick of overwriting the argv array.
    After the first release, several people contributed portability fixes; they are
    credited in generic.h and the Makefile.  Lauren Burka inspired the ascii art
    for this revised document.  Dean Gaudet at Wired supplied a precursor to
    the hex-dump code, and mudge@l0pht.com originally experimented with and
    supplied code for the telnet-options responder.  Outbound "-e <prog>" resulted
    from a need to quietly bypass a firewall installation.  Other suggestions and
    patches have rolled in for which I am always grateful, but there are only 26
    hours per day and a discussion of feature creep near the end of this document.
    
    Netcat was written with the Russian railroad in mind -- conservatively built
    and solid, but it *will* get you there.  While the coding style is fairly
    "tight", I have attempted to present it cleanly [keeping *my* lines under 80
    characters, dammit] and put in plenty of comments as to why certain things
    are done.  Items I know to be questionable are clearly marked with "XXX".
    Source code was made to be modified, but determining where to start is
    difficult with some of the tangles of spaghetti code that are out there.
    Here are some of the major points I feel are worth mentioning about netcat's
    internal design, whether or not you agree with my approach.
    
    Except for generic.h, which changes to adapt more platforms, netcat is a single
    source file.  This has the distinct advantage of only having to include headers
    once and not having to re-declare all my functions in a billion different
    places.  I have attempted to contain all the gross who's-got-what-.h-file
    things in one small dumping ground.  Functions are placed "dependencies-first",
    such that when the compiler runs into the calls later, it already knows the
    type and arguments and won't complain.  No function prototyping -- not even the
    __P(()) crock -- is used, since it is more portable and a file of this size is
    easy enough to check manually.  Each function has a standard-format comment
    ahead of it, which is easily found using the regexp " :$".  I freely use gotos.
    Loops and if-clauses are made as small and non-nested as possible, and the ends
    of same *marked* for clarity [I wish everyone would do this!!].
    
    Large structures and buffers are all malloc()ed up on the fly, slightly larger
    than the size asked for and zeroed out.  This reduces the chances of damage
    from those "end of the buffer" fencepost errors or runaway pointers escaping
    off the end.  These things are permanent per run, so nothing needs to be freed
    until the program exits.
    
    File descriptor zero is always expected to be standard input, even if it is
    closed.  If a new network descriptor winds up being zero, a different one is
    asked for which will be nonzero, and fd zero is simply left kicking around
    for the rest of the run.  Why?  Because everything else assumes that stdin is
    always zero and "netfd" is always positive.  This may seem silly, but it was a
    lot easier to code.  The new fd is obtained directly as a new socket, because
    trying to simply dup() a new fd broke subsequent socket-style use of the new fd
    under Solaris' stupid streams handling in the socket library.
    
    The catch-all message and error handlers are implemented with an ample list of
    phoney arguments to get around various problems with varargs.  Varargs seems
    like deliberate obfuscation in the first place, and using it would also
    require use of vfprintf() which not all platforms support.  The trailing
    sleep in bail() is to allow output to flush, which is sometimes needed if
    netcat is already on the other end of a network connection.
    
    The reader may notice that the section that does DNS lookups seems much
    gnarlier and more confusing than other parts.  This is NOT MY FAULT.  The
    sockaddr and hostent abstractions are an abortion that forces the coder to
    deal with it.  Then again, a lot of BSD kernel code looks like similar
    struct-pointer hell.  I try to straighten it out somewhat by defining my own
    HINF structure, containing names, ascii-format IP addresses, and binary IP
    addresses.  I fill this structure exactly once per host argument, and squirrel
    everything safely away and handy for whatever wants to reference it later.
    
    Where many other network apps use the FIONBIO ioctl to set non-blocking I/O
    on network sockets, netcat uses straightforward blocking I/O everywhere.
    This makes everything very lock-step, relying on the network and filesystem
    layers to feed in data when needed.  Data read in is completely written out
    before any more is fetched.  This may not be quite the right thing to do under
    some OSes that don't do timed select() right, but this remains to be seen.
    
    The hexdump routine is written to be as fast as possible, which is why it does
    so much work itself instead of just sprintf()ing everything together.  Each
    dump line is built into a single buffer and atomically written out using the
    lowest level I/O calls.  Further improvements could undoubtedly be made by
    using writev() and eliminating all sprintf()s, but it seems to fly right along
    as is.  If both exec-a-prog mode and a hexdump file is asked for, the hexdump
    flag is deliberately turned off to avoid creating random zero-length files.
    Files are opened in "truncate" mode; if you want "append" mode instead, change
    the open flags in main().
    
    main() may look a bit hairy, but that's only because it has to go down the
    argv list and handle multiple ports, random mode, and exit status.  Efforts
    have been made to place a minimum of code inside the getopt() loop.  Any real
    work is sent off to functions in what is hopefully a straightforward way.
    
    Obligatory vendor-bash: If "nc" had become a standard utility years ago,
    the commercial vendors would have likely packaged it setuid root and with
    -DGAPING_SECURITY_HOLE turned on but not documented.  It is hoped that netcat
    will aid people in finding and fixing the no-brainer holes of this sort that
    keep appearing, by allowing easier experimentation with the "bare metal" of
    the network layer.
    
    It could be argued that netcat already has too many features.  I have tried
    to avoid "feature creep" by limiting netcat's base functionality only to those
    things which are truly relevant to making network connections and the everyday
    associated DNS lossage we're used to.  Option switches already have slightly
    overloaded functionality.  Random port mode is sort of pushing it.  The
    hex-dump feature went in later because it *is* genuinely useful.  The
    telnet-responder code *almost* verges on the gratuitous, especially since it
    mucks with the data stream, and is left as an optional piece.  Many people have
    asked for example "how 'bout adding encryption?" and my response is that such
    things should be separate entities that could pipe their data *through* netcat
    instead of having their own networking code.  I am therefore not completely
    enthusiastic about adding any more features to this thing, although you are
    still free to send along any mods you think are useful.
    
    Nonetheless, at this point I think of netcat as my tcp/ip swiss army knife,
    and the numerous companion programs and scripts to go with it as duct tape.
    Duct tape of course has a light side and a dark side and binds the universe
    together, and if I wrap enough of it around what I'm trying to accomplish,
    it *will* work.  Alternatively, if netcat is a large hammer, there are many
    network protocols that are increasingly looking like nails by now...
    	 


    Netcat Man page

    NC(1)                      OpenBSD Reference Manual                      NC(1)
    
    NAME
         nc - arbitrary TCP and UDP connections and listens
    
    
    
    SYNOPSIS
         nc [-e command] [-g intermediates] [-G hopcount] [-i interval] [-lnrtuvz]
            [-o filename] [-p source port] [-s ip address] [-w timeout] [hostname]
            [port[s...]]
    
    DESCRIPTION
         The nc (or netcat) utility is used for just about anything under the sun
         involving TCP or UDP.  It can open TCP connections, send UDP packets,
         listen on arbitrary TCP and UDP ports, do port scanning, and source rout-
         ing.  Unlike telnet(1),  nc scripts nicely, and separates error messages
         onto standard error instead of sending them to standard output, as tel-
         net(1) does with some.
    
         Destination ports can be single integers, names as listed in services(5),
          or ranges.  Ranges are in the form nn-mm, and several separate ports
         and/or ranges may be specified on the command line.
    
         Common uses include:
    
         -   simple TCP proxies
    
         -   shell-script based HTTP clients and servers
    
         -   network daemon testing
    
         -   source routing based connectivity testing
    
         -   and much, much more
    
         The options are as follows:
    
         -e command
                 Execute the specified command, using data from the network for
                 stdin, and sending stdout and stderr to the network.  This option
                 is only present if nc was compiled with the GAPING_SECURITY_HOLE
                 compile time option, since it allows users to make arbitrary pro-
                 grams available to anyone on the network.
    
         -g intermediate-host
                 Specifies a hop along a loose source routed path.  Can be used
                 more than once to build a chain of hop points.
    
         -G pointer
                 Positions the "hop counter" within the list of machines in the
                 path of a source routed packet.  Must be a multiple of 4.
    
         -i seconds
                 Specifies a delay time interval between lines of text sent and
                 received.  Also causes a delay time between connections to multi-
                 ple ports.
    
         -l      Is used to specify that nc should listen for an incoming connec-
                 tion, rather than initiate a connection to a remote host.  Any
                 hostname/IP address and port arguments restrict the source of in-
                 bound connections to only that address and source port.
    
         -n      Do not do DNS lookups on any of the specified addresses or host-
                 names, or names of port numbers from /etc/services.
    
         -o filename
                 Create a hexadecimal log of data transferred in the specified
                 file.  Each line begins with ``<'' or ``>''.  ``<'' means "from
                 the net" and ``>'' means "to the net".
    
         -p port
                 Specifies the source port nc should use, subject to privilege re-
                 strictions and availability.
    
         -r      Specifies that source and/or destination ports should be chosen
                 semi-randomly instead of sequentially within a range or in the
                 order that the system assigns.
    
         -s hostname/ip-address
                 Specifies the IP of the interface which is used to send the pack-
                 ets.  On some platforms, this can be used for UDP spoofing by us-
                 ing ifconfig(8) to bring up a dummy interface with the desired
                 source IP address.
    
         -t      Causes nc to send RFC854 DON'T and WON'T responses to RFC854 DO
                 and WILL requests.  This makes it possible to use nc to script
                 telnet sessions.  The presence of this option can be enabled or
                 disabled as a compile-time option.
    
         -u      Use UDP instead of TCP.  On most platforms, nc will behave as if
                 a connection is established until it receives an ICMP packet in-
                 dicating that there is no program listening to what it sends.
    
         -v      Verbose.  Cause nc to display connection information.  Using -v
                 more than once will cause nc to become even more verbose.
    
         -w timeout
                 Specifies the number of seconds nc should wait before deciding
                 that an attempt to establish a connection is hopeless.  Also used
                 to specify how long to wait for more network data after standard
                 input closes.
    
         -z      Specifies that nc should just scan for listening daemons, without
                 sending any data to them.  Diagnostic messages about refused con-
                 nections will not be displayed unless -v is specified twice.
    
    EXAMPLES
         nc
           Wait for the user to type what would normally be command-line arguments
           in at stdin.
    
         nc example.host 42
           Open a TCP connection to port 42 of example.host.  If the connection
           fails, do not display any error messages, but simply exit.
    
         nc -p 31337 example.host 42
           Open a TCP connection to port 42 of example.host, and use port 31337 as
           the source port.
    
         nc -w 5 example.host 42
           Open a TCP connection to port 42 of example.host, and time out after
           five seconds while attempting to connect.
    
         nc -u example.host 53
           Send any data from stdin to UDP port 53 of example.host, and display
           any data returned.
    
         nc -s 10.1.2.3 example.host 42
           Open a TCP connection to port 42 of example.host using 10.1.2.3 as the
           IP for the local end of the connection.
    
         nc -v example.host 42
           Open a TCP connection to port 42 of example.host, displaying some diag-
           nostic messages on stderr.
    
         nc -v -v example.host 42
           Open a TCP connection to port 42 of example.host, displaying all diag-
           nostic messages on stderr.
    
         nc -v -z example.host 20-30
           Attempt to open TCP connections to ports 20 through 30 of example.host,
           and report which ones nc was able to connect to.
    
         nc -v -u -z -w 3 example.host 20-30
           Send UDP packets to ports 20-30 of example.host, and report which ones
           did not respond with an ICMP packet after three seconds.
    
         nc -l -p 3000
           Listen on TCP port 3000, and once there is a connection, send stdin to
           the remote host, and send data from the remote host to stdout.
    
         echo foobar | nc example.host 1000
           Connect to port 1000 of example.host, send the string "foobar" followed
           by a newline, and move data from port 1000 of example.host to stdout
           until example.host closes the connection.
    
    SEE ALSO
         cat(1),  telnet(1)
    
         The netcat README.
    
    AUTHOR
         *Hobbit*  [hobbit@avian.org]
    
    OpenBSD 2.6                     August 1, 1996                               3
    


    Application Use ://

  • TCP / UDP port logger
  • Text file Server
  • Netcat LPR ( printing )
  • Web Page gets ( Web Clients )
  • Web Page sends ( Web Servers )





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